This paper shows that, on the basis of a Ramsey model, a firm that maximizes the profit rate, subject to a technology with diminishing marginal products, achieves better equilibrium levels than a firm maximizing net profit. It is also shown the nonexistence of labor market and unemployment under steady state conditions.
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l. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze a Ramsey type model in which a competitive firm maximizes the profit rate, instead of maximizing profits as in the neoclassical set up. Profit rate is defined by the ratio between total earnings and total production costs, minus one.
Neoclassical theory of production establishes as a main hypothesis, that firms maximize profits subject to their technology. Profits are defined as the difference between total earnings and production costs, and their maximization is subject to diminishing marginal returns in order to assure positive profits. Besides, it holds that under a competitive environment, where all economic agents take prices of goods and inputs as given, the system as a whole, i.e. the set of all individual producers and consumers, reaches an efficient solution. However, this paper shows that the profit maximization problem under competitive conditions is not an efficient solution.
In other words, it is shown that an efficient solution to the problem of the firm is based on the maximization of the rate of profit instead of the corresponding and traditional profits fl.ow function. 1 This conclusion is maintained by supposing the existence of competitive markets, decreasing returns to scale in the production side, and one composed good. That means, as it has been stated in Noriega (2001, chapter 6) , that the traditional profit maximization hypothesis describes an economic agent whose behavior is inefficient, and therefore it <loes not support the assumption in which everyone look foi maximizing their own profit. Then, in an economy where each firm maximizes the profit rate, we obtain a superior equilibrium in the sense of Pareto to that regrading an economy where firms are profit leve! maximizers. 2 The problem analyzed in this paper <loes not represent a criticism to the firm theory as many authors have attempted to make. Between these authors, there are sorne who do not accept the framework of profit maximization as a suitable criterium to describe a reasonable firm behavior (Kreps, 1987 and 1990) . Essentially, Kreps argues that the managers not always have the incentives to maximize profits in the name of shareholders, and that firms could maximize other objective functions more preferred for them. In this paper, we follow approaches that neglect the existence of firms as maximizing entities. 3 Although we accept that a firm follows a rational behavior that implies maximization, and that it looks for reaching the maximum profits fl.ow, we shall find that the maximization of profit fl.ows is not enough to hold an efficient solution. Then, efficient solution, accepting that firms follow a maximizing behavior, rests in the maximization of profit rates.
Results shown in Noriega (1994 Noriega ( , 2001 are static. This paper extends such a concept to a dynamic framework by means of a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type model. We begin with the explanation of a non-monetary economy with two types of agent: consumers and producers. We suppose the existence of a single representative consumer with infinite life, an intertemporal utility function in a competitive environment, and that derives utility from the consumption of a single good. Such a consumer maximizes a present value utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Finally, we suppose that producers maximize the profit rate on a daily basis, taking into account a technology with diminishing marginal products, since it is assumed that the firm hires capital and labor services, and has not adjustment costs. Hence, there are not intertemporal elements in firm's maximization problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, we expose a model of a decentralized economy under static conditions, in order to show the axiomatic foundations of equilibrium where firms (producers) maximize the profit rate under competitive conditions. In the second part, we state the dynamic model with profit rate maximization under regular competitive conditions. Here we derivate the steady state equilibrium and carry out stability proof, as well as unemployment existence and welfare properties introducing a central planner. Finally, in the third part, we draw sorne conclusions about main results of the model.
Foundations of a Model with Firms Maximizing the Profit Rate
In order to, properly, show the analytical bases of the Ramsey type model where the firm's problem is to maximize its profit rate, it is necessary to state the fundamental differences between the formal expression of the traditional hypothesis about firm's economic behavior and its equilibrium, compared to that reached by profit rate maximizing agents. For it, suppose a competitive economy with two representative agents: a consumer, who maximizes an strictly concave utility function subject to a budget restriction, and a producer, who maximizes the rate of profit, subject to a technical constraint, namely, diminishing marginal products.
Since the traditional production function with decreasing returns <loes not allow the maximization of profit rate, except where profit rate becomes infinite, and production and factor quantities are both zero, to make that the firm maximizes the profit rate over the efficiency frontier of the production function with non-zero prodliction and employment, another element must be included: the distinction between the labor needed to organize the firm and the labor employed directly on production. The main implication of it, is the change in the concept of firm itself. Traditionally, firms are thought as agents pursuing profit goals just to the point where the engineering of production allows it, and the organization is completely left away of the definition. Here, we will take into account firms engineering as well as its organization.
Let us denote labor by L, product by Q, profit by II, profit rate by 7í, wages by W, and prod uct price by P. The subindex d and s will indica te demand or supply, respectively. Variable L * will correspond to the quantity of labor employed by the firm in order to organize all of its processes. In other words, L * will be the bigger number of contracts established by the firm in order to em:ploy labor and to sell product, which will depend of the size of product market. It must be stated now that L * will not introduce neither increasing returns effects nor indivisibilities. Moreover, taking into account the traditional hypothesis, L * would not imply any change in the first order conditions for the firm. Thus, the economic calculations of representative agents are given by the following maximization problems: 2.1 Firms As mentioned befare, usual neoclassical representations of firms are based on the maximization of profit function,
where Ld > L * .
4 Moreover, note that this kind of production function <loes not modify the first order conditions
(4) With these two equations is possible to salve for employment and production optimum levels for the firm, once the real wage is known. Now, let us define profits level (II) as the result of a profit rate ( 7r) applied to the total costs to produce Q (in this case, total wages) (5) and replacing it in (1), the objective function becomes the profit rate instead of its level. Then, the maximizing behavior of this agent will be given by
for any Ld > L *. Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions,
Thus, the representative producer's equilibrium plan to maximize 7r, is found at the point of the production function where marginal product equals average product. Dividing both sides of (8) by the average product, it can be shown that the equilibrium corresponds to the point of the production function where labor elasticity of product is equal to one,
Given the real wage, the slope of the isorate of profit function will depend exclusively on 1r. The following figure shows the firm's equilibrium, Point "a" shows the agent's equilibrium. Another point of the production function, for instance "b" or "c", the profit rate will be lower. Considering that a neoclassical equilibrium would correspond to any point to the right of "a", like "b", there is evidence that maximizing II will necessarily lead to an inferior profit rate, regarding maximum 7r, which is referred in "a" . Maximum 7r will always match the rriaximum average product.
In order to calculate employment and production equilibrium levels, it is needed to solve the system given by the first order conditions (8) and (9). To see this, suppose that function (7) is homogeneous ofdegree µ, µ>O, in (Ld -L*) . Then, in virtue of Euler's theorem, (9) can be written as follows,
Replacing (10) into (8') and solving for Ld, we get the following labor demand function ,
Now, substituting (11) in (9), we get the corresponding product supply function, Both functions (11 and 12) show sorne fundamental results. On the one hand, we have that labor demand is independent of W and P, and exclusively dependent on the size of market through L *. Independently of the characteristics that labor supply could have, the labor market will not be performed, unlike the neoclassical framework takes place. This market <loes not exist in the competitive structure of our model. Firms will not employ higher levels of labor if wages decrease like the neoclassical theory predicts commonly. They will only increase employment if L * rises, and it will only happen if the number of contracts grows. Since firms do not follow the signa! of wages to take their decisions, they will decide the employment leve! that maximizes -their profit rate according to the number of contracts they are supposed to accomplish. It means that labor demand will increase (decrease) if market expands (reduces) its size. The inverse relation between wages and employment, fundamental in the traditional hypothesis frame , <loes not exist here.
On the other hand, we have the product supply function, which is independent of W and P as well. This one becomes positive regarding L * (like the labor demand) , even though its slope decreases as long as L * grows. That is, the rational behavior of firm is related with the size of sales, once the prices and wages assure economic viability of production.
Labor demand and product supply functions imply that firms will maximize their profit rate iff W and P ensure profits for the firm. Given W a nd P, if firms sell less than what market demands, they would b e missing possible profits, as well as if they produce more than what market requires. T hen, t he firms will always follow market demandas the signa! to maxim ize.
Finally, it is important to point out that it can be shown that in equations (6) to (12) there is more than one pair (W, P) that would fit each one (Ld, Q 8 ) couple. The usual one-to-one relation between prices and quantities has been abandoned by results.
Consumer
Our representative agent maximizes a strictly concave utility function defined on two independent variables: leisure, S, and consumption, Qd. Leisure is defined as the difference between labor, L 8 , and total available time, T. Then, (13) Hence, the maximizing behavior of the consumer will be given by
The first order conditions are given by
The budget constraint corresponds to a regime of property where each consumer only owns its right and capacity to work. The property rights on firms will be distributed among the consumers by the economy, through the work contracts. These rights are not previously assigned, as the traditional hypothesis usually states. So representative consumer will receive a part of his income from its labor supply (V\ages), and another part from its property rights on firms, represented in (17) by the term 7rW Ls: If an agent is not employed at all, its income will be zero.
It is possible to verify that the income-expenses ratio of the firm, derived from (6), along with the budget constraint of consumer, equation (15), lead to the Walras' law expression that assures the accountable consistency of the model,
By definition, we can write the marginal rate of substitution at the equilibrium point, as a fixed proportion
The parameter efJ is a real positive number which comes from the parametric structure of preferences. Replacing (16') in (16) and solving the system, we get the following results,
ii) Labor supply function (20) We can see that both functions have a standard shape. Product demand function is directly related to income and inversely to P. Labor supply is inelastic to wages, due to the fiexibility of the mechanism of property rights assignment that we have assumed. Even though we have already reached the result of nonexistence of labor market, and (20) reinforces this result, inelastic labor supply should not represent by itself any problem for labor market 's performance, since it is frequently employed in neoclassical framework as a standard assumption to analyze employment and wages. However, if we associate it with labor demand (11), the result is clearly the nonexistence ofsomething like a "labor market". Doubtless, there is a labor sector where employment phenomena is suitable for analysis, but it can not be considered a market. Thus W / P is not defined neither by labor supply nor by demand, as usually stated. It becomes now a distributive variable determined exogenously to the market system, by me ans of wage bargain.
General Equilibrium
General equilibrium conditions for the model will be i) Product market (the only one existing)
On the one hand, the excess demand function (21) is equal to zero since we assumed that P and W are strictly positive. On the other hand, (22) is defined with an inequality to consider the existence of unemployment. Using the following equations, we will show that unemployment exists although P and W are positive, and still if they change under perfect price fiexibility conditions. To see this, we substitute (12), and (19) into the equation (21), and replace (11) and (20) into (22). Thus, we get the following functions, (23) and (24) Now , we can salve for L * and obtain the equilibrium average product given by the term (1+7r)(W/P). Since we are supossing a non-monetary economy, the real wage will be a variable exogenously determined, which <loes not mean that it will be fixed. Its determination could be subject to any mechanism of price adjustment, including Walrasian criteria.
Equalizing to zero (24), it will give us the magnitude of L * for full employment,
Substituting (25) into (23), and solving it for full employment average product, we have (26) This equation will stand for any positive magnitude of L *. It means that L * could even be inferior to its magnitude of full employment and still determine an equilibrium solution for product market. Let e be, O > e> 1, it is possible to define , using (25), an L* lower to its full employment magnitude
Replacing (27) in (23), we get the following expression, (28) Now, we can see that the magnitude of the average product is lower. However, the existence of unemployment does not modify the equilibrium in the product market . Equilibrium becomes perfectly compatible with this fact, due to labor market inexistence. Real wage could change or not, but profit rate will necessarily change as the average product increases with unemployment.
Up to this point, we shall raise a question: we have to ask us the following: What are the causal relations to explain production and employment levels? The ans:wer is that product demand determines employment leve!. Using equation (23) (29) Here, labor demand, and the employment leve!, become positive functions of product demand. From the previous result, the size of market is defined to (30) Since W / P is determ.ined exogenously, the employment, production and distribution are simaltaneo,usly settled. We can already generalize the following conclusion: market equilibtium is perpetua!, independently of employment leve!. 5 5 In this case, market "(ill concern exclusively to the only product produced by the economy. But , it is easy to show that with more than one product, the system will admit as many markets as product.s exist. However, labor sector will not be one of these markets. For all price levels, there is a number of profitable transactions that are completely accomplished by agents in all markets, independently of whether there is unemployment or not. Firms sell exactly what market demands, if they sell more or less than it was demanded, they may loose. Hence, equilibrium m markets is, for all sides, naturally perpetual, as the model has shown it.
Economic Dynamics with Profit Rate Maximization
Let us now define a dynamic continuous time system where consumption and capital accumulation are explained from existing relationships between consumers and producers in an infinite horizon optimizing model. Here, following usual assumptions, let N(t) be the total population at time t, with a constant growth rate given by n. There is only one product which can be either consumed or stored over time, depending on the intertemporal agent's decisions over resources optimal allocation. Finally, we will assume that product is considered as net rather than gross output, in order to eliminate sorne specific capital depreciation rules.
Firms
Firms maximize an instantaneous profit rate function subject to a production function with decreasing returns to scale, and specified on labor and capital.
(31) (32) Leaving away t to simplify all expressions, and assuming that real wage is given by w and interest rate by r, we obtain the following equations using the first order conditions. and
From this pair of equations, we can see that labor market will not exist in the model. On the one hand, since labor demand is independent of wages and prices in every t, which is a result of the producers maximization, and the other hand, the labor supply is inelastic and is exogenously determined for consumers. Nevertheless, on the bases of (34) it_ will shown later that aggregate employment leve! depends directly on wages, reverting in this way the traditional relationship between wages and employment supported by neoclassical framework. According to this framework, we know that wage should be equal to marginal productivity of labor, and that employment is inversely related to wages.
From the first order conditions, wages cannot be determined endogenously for the model. Thus, they must be determined exogenously. This means that there is no reason to accept that wages and productivity of labor follow a regular rule, and therefore to be consistent with the concept of ful! employment and economic efficiency. However, nonexistence of labor market <loes not imply that product market <loes not work (neither that wages have to be sticky), since it is possible to use sorne adjustment rule (even a walrasian one) to determine w. Now, by subst ituting (34) into (33), we arrive to the next expression, independent of L *, concerning the interest rate,
Consumers
We assume that consumers maximize their fiow of utility a long time. The objective function of consumers is
Assuming p > n, where p is the rate of time preference and n is the rate of growth of population, we avoid that preferences are explosive. As we can see from the functional form of u(c(t)), the utility function is concave and continuous. We analyze the case of a decentralized economy, thereby we postulate the following individual's budget constraint,
(t)k(t)) -c(t) -nk(t). (38)
In equation (38), 7r describes the profit rate; w is t he individual wage assuming that every individual supplies inelastically just a unit of labor per unit of time; k is the stock of physical capital owned by each consumer assuming that all assets are equal to physical capital invested by firms; and k = dk/dt.
The consumer problem is to maximize the objective function (36), subject to budget constraint (38) . Therefore, the corresponding Hamiltonian is
J = u (c(t)) e-(p-n)t + >-((1 + 7r)(w + r(t)k(t)) -c(t) -nk(t)). (39)
Here, e is the control variable, k is a state variable, and finally >-is the co-state variable. Abstracting from the temporal notation t, the first order conditions are
~=-.A((l+7r)r -n).
( 41)
Differentiating ( 40) In equilibrium, we have, from ( 42), that the interest rate equals the in verse of the elasticity of substitution times the rate of growth of consumption plus the rate of time preference, as a proportion of the rate of profit factor. The main difference of this result, compared with the traditional, is that in equilibrium, the rate of interest is inversely related to the rate of profit. In the usual approach, the rate of profit does not appear in the analysis since the objective funcion of producers is the fiow of profits, instead of the rate of profit.
The intuition behind this later equation can be expressed as follows: If the return on investment, i. e. the rate of profit, increases, it will imply that the cost of a unit of capital will tend to decrease, since the investment becomes attractive for entrepreneurs while the market expands.
From (42), we arrive to the growth rate for consumption,
Expression ( 43) is the Euler' s equation. 6 The growth rate of consumption is an increasing function of profit and interest rate. If we assume that the rate of profit is the total return over the resources invested, capital and labor, in this model, we have that the representative consumer is interested on increasing future consumption as profit rate becomes greater. In the same way, the grater is the return on capital stock r, the bigger the stimulus agents will have to increase future consumption. Finally, and as anyother Ramsey type model, the growth rate of consumption decreases as greater are the rate of time preference and the elasticity of substitution.
Equilibrium
From the above analysis, we have the next motion equations: in which the profit rate <loes not appear. Under these conditions, the comsumption growth rate increases regarding the interest rate and decreases regarding the subjective rate of discount, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Equation (38) is the individual's budget constraint, and (43) is the Euler's equation. However, from the producer side we have already arrived to the next relation (35) By substituting (35) into equation (38) , and (43), we have that
At steady-state conditions, with k = O, the level of per capita consumption is: In (46) and (47) 
In this equilibrium we have that e* and k* both tend to increase while the profit rate and the wage increase. As. a natural result it happens that if the rate of intertemporal preference is increasing, the steady state level for capital decreases. However, in the traditional Ramsey model, changes in the subjective rate of discount just modify the locus corresponding to k*. Following equations (47) and (48), we have that if pis increased the steady state level of capital decreases, and the consumption level increases. The later result is not common in the traditional Ramsey model. If the parameters change, we have that the steady state equilibrium changes as well. Let us turn now to the stability conditions to observe the dynamics of the behavior out of the equilibrium, once that its existence has been demonstrated.
Stability
In the previous section we have proved the existence of steady state equilibrium. Now we turn to analyze the stability conditions of the model. Given that the system (44)- (45) is not linear, we will first linearize it, and then, we will obtain the eigenvalues corresponding to the characteristic matrix, in order to determine the stability conditions.
Linearizing the system (44)-(45) around the steady state, and taking into account that the steady state has been calculated in (47)- (48), we arrive to the following linear system,
(50) (1 + 7r)wf3
Reordering the system in matrix notation, we have (~) = ( -e2cf'-/3l 01 ) (k) + (~) . 
(53) 2 Following the initial conditions assumed in this model, we have that the term then we have two real roots. The root >-1 is negative, and >-2 is, in general, positive. Considering t hese results we have that the system has an stable branch.
.5 U nemploy m e nt
Up to this point we have not made any distinction between labor supply and demand, and thus full employment has been automatically assumed in ali results. However, starting from such a situation it will be now shown that unemployment <loes not exist in a steady state. For it, let qd be the per capita output demand obtained by adding e and nk from (38) 
Dueto (35) it will be reduced to (~) w.
-f3
(55) Now, let ent be the size of labor supply at time t. Thus the output aggregated demand level will be given by (56) Aggregated supply will be given from the production function (32), and substituting (34) in order to get the output leve! that would m:aximize the profit rate at every period.
Q 0 =( a ) ªL*ªK 13 .
-a -{3
(57)
Since the system will be in perpetua! equilibrium in the product market, the following expression will be valid for every t, (58)
Taking into account that producers side will be specified by labor demand and capital leve!, we can make the following algebra,
Then, we arrive to the labor demand function,
Equation (62) shows that employmen~ leve! will be a function of aggregated demand of product in every t, depending on the population size, wages and profit rate. Moreover, it has an inverse relation with capital leve!. It is important to observe that employment will be positive even if profit rate becomes zero; but if w becomes zero the employment leve! will be zero as well.
In terms of per capita capital, it may be wrítten as follows,
The demonstration of unemployment existence is possible through different ways given by the model. We will take the one indicated hy the labor sector's excess demand function, which is given by (64)
Although with equation (65), the existence of unemployment is possible, we have not shown so far anything about it. Substituting (47) and (63) into (64) in order to place the excess demand function in the per capita capital leve! of stationary state, 7 we obtain the following equation 7 It must be considered that per capita capital is determined by consumers on the ha.sis of an equal amount of capital granted to every new individual member born in the community, so in stationary state the amount of k will be given by (47). In other words t he per capita capital will be defined on labor supply, not on labor demand.
The unemployment existence demonstration is quite simple,
/3 "' !.::;;,/!..
Graphically, equations (64) through (66) would be shown as follows, Figure 4 . Labor Demand and Labor Supply Over Time.
L,ent
Curve L represents labor demand, and curve ent, labor supply. The area defined between both curves, and to the left of point "a", corresponds to unemployment. It shows how from any unemployment situation, the system would evolve towards full employment represented in "a"; unless a negative wage shock displaces L to the right, giving in this way a longer term to unemployment . The dashed segment of L, to the right of "a", is referred to impossible employment levels. Thus the maximum feasible will always be determined by labor supply.
This result implies that as long as wages get lower for a null or positive profit rate, giving place to aggregated demand fluctuations, unemployment will be present in the system. This demonstration is possible due to the fact that the consumption and per capita capital are calculated regarding the size of labor supply, and can be kept constant as required in steady state, even if employment level (labor demand) fluctuates. From (46) and (47), we know that if wages change every time, steady state will change as well. It implies that any reduction in wages will generate a change in the steady state and unemployment. However, if wage reduction is an instantaneous shock, unemployment will be temporary, and its reduction toward full employmen~will be reached due to the demand expansion, which appears from exogenous population growth. Once the full employment is reached again, its level will be preserved until another negative shock affects the economy.
If wage reduction is a continuous phenomena, unemployment could last through the long term. In other words, long term unemployment would take place, even more if wage reductions appear simultaneously to profit rate reductions. Then, newer steady states would replace older ones recursively.
Nnll profit rate would correspond in this model to the usual long term condition of neoclassical growth models built on Solow's tradition. Under such a condition, wages reduction would be the only possib)e cause of unemployment, always associated to changes in steady state.
A necessary conditiq:Q. to keep full employment in the system is that wages are maintained equal or liigb.er than every previous period, but never lower. The latest will, unavoida8ly, cause unemployment, and even though the intra generational distributive phenomena derived from unemployment has not been analyzed here, it is possible to argue along with our model, that its effects would probably imply in the future full employment situations.
Welfare Properties of The Model
Assume now that there is a central benevolent planner whose goal is to maximize the utility function of the representative consumer, subject to dynamic resources constraint in terms of product and with 'no prices at all,
Here all variables are expressed in per capita terms, excepting L due to the condition of decreasing returns to scale on production function . So l* corresponds to the per capita representation of the organizational ability inherent to the technology, and L refers to total labor employment.
The definition of k, as it has been made in (68), becomes from equation (31), and its per capita expression in (38). The reason of this definition is that the addition of costs multiplied by the rate of profits plus one is equal to the production function; which represents the resources constraint free of prices and of distributive variables. In this way, the equation (68) could be taken into account by the planner in order to make its maximization.
The Keynes-Ramsey condition obtained from the present value Hamiltonian for (68) is given by
It means that the central planner will set the value of l* and L in order to determine the consumption growth rate. It implies that the system will not necessarily stay in a full employment situation, since it depends on the planner's decision. It is to say that he will include employment leve! and technology into the economy to maximize the social welfare. Now, from the constraint k and the equation (69) we arrive to the following results corresponding to steady state,
These equations show that there will exist as many steady states as (l*, L) pairs are given by the planner. Even under ful! employment, the possibility of many steady states will hold unchanged. However, we could expect a Pareto optima! situation only if ful! employment occurs in such a system, but employment leve! by itself is not enuogh to ensure the maximum social welfare. Among ali possible steady states there will always be one reachable state that would make (46) equal to (70), and (47) 
In such a case, both the decentralized economy result and that corresponding to the central planner, will agree.
Conclusions
The model developed in this paper opens severa! lines of research as it gives place to results that are not usual in the current literature based on dynamic framework of the Ramsey type. The first motivation to present this contribution is to extend sorne results described by Noriega (1994 Noriega ( , 2001 ) in a static environment, to a dynamic model usually and widely employed in macroeconomics: the Ramsey model, and particularly the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans approach, which is considered as a dynamic general equilibrium analytical framework. As we have stated above, the point of departure of the problem is the maximization of the profit rate as the main target of the competitive firm.
In the first place, we have shown that the results displayed in the Ramsey framework, once we are using the profit rate maximization hypothesis, are quite different than those obtained when the producer maximizes the corresponding profits fiow. The differences bear in the fact that either the wage and the rate of profit are drivers of the motion for consumption and physical capital. We arrive to a solution in which the rate of wage is, first, exogenous, and second, is determining the equations of motion for the two relevant variables of the model. The corresponding locus of steady state is formally and geometrically different if compared with the traditional results. However, the model shows properties of stability. Surely this result of stability rests on the fact that diminishing returns to capital are present in the model.
In the second place, we conclude that the results in a decentralized economy are different than those calculated by a central planner, since the interest rate a long this model is obtained in a very different way to that of the conventional Ramsey type model. The interest rate in this contribution does not equal the marginal product of physical capital. Thus, the result of the maximization of a utility function subject to a resources constraint becomes different than those using an individual budget constraint. Under these conditions we arrive to the fact that thc central planner must choose over the leve! of employment; that means that the employment used in the production of final goods itself, and the number of workers employed in the firms's facilities, must be decided by the planner in arder to salve the model.
In this contribution, unemployment arises as a result completely compatible with steady state general equilibrium, and gives the possibility to show that it can be a long term phenomenon. Given the fact that the rate of wage becomes an exogenous and distributive variable, and since we assume that individuals are supplying a single unit of labor on a daily basis, the ful! employment is just one of the possible results in a decentralized economy in which producers maximize the rate of profit. Labor market nonexistence has been continuously highlighted as a main feature of the model, a result that suggests t he need of reinterpretation of the dynamics of a competitive economy.
